UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24917
1 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 1 June 1992 to 30 November 1992)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June 1992 to 30 November 1992 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 759 (1992) of 12 June 1992 the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices and to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made. 1/

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The functions of UNFICYP were originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992. In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 2/

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1992:

	Military personnel		
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	331	
	Military police company	9	347
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The First Regiment The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police company	11	575

Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 57	323	
	Military police company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, A Squadron, 16th/5th Lancers	109	
	5th Regiment Royal Artillery	339	
	UNFICYP support regiment	45	
	Royal engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	53	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police company	9	755
	Civilian police		
Australia		20	
Sweden		18	38
Totoal UNFICYP			2 078

4. In my report in document S/24581 of 21 September 1992, I stated that contributing Governments had given firm indications that they would be reducing the operational commitment of their contingents. These reductions will include the withdrawal of the Danish infantry battalion (though some of its personnel will remain in UNFICYP headquarters), the reduction of the British contingent by 198 personnel, including the whole of the Force scout car squadron, and reductions in the Austrian and Canadian contingents of 63 and 61 personnel, respectively. This will reduce UNFICYP's strength from 2,078 to 1,488 personnel, a reduction of approximately 28 per cent. In order to maintain the Force's ability to implement its present mandate to the greatest extent possible, restructuring and reorganization of the remaining contingents commenced on 16 November 1992 when the 63 Austrian personnel were withdrawn and will be completed by 15 December 1992.

5. The sectors will be reduced from four to three (as shown on the attached map). The British battalion will assume responsibility for the whole of the sector previously controlled by the Danish contingent. This will be known as Sector Two and will cover the area from Kokkina to the United Nations protected area (UNPA). Sector Three, controlled by the Canadian battalion, will expand to the west and will now cover the area from the UNPA to Athienou. There will be no change to the area monitored by the Austrian contingent, Sector Four. The Force reserve will consist of four reinforcement platoons, one from each sector plus one from the support regiment.

6. As a result of the troop-contributing Governments' decisions to reduce their contingents, the number of permanently manned observation posts will have to fall from 51 to 39. This will mean that in future UNFICYP may not be able to react as rapidly as in the past to cease-fire violations or incidents. The Force's ability to maintain constant liaison and communication with all command levels of the military forces of both sides will also be affected. It is, therefore, extremely important that both sides exercise the greatest possible restraint and make every effort to avoid incidents that could lead to tension in the buffer zone.

7. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Michael F. Minehane.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

8. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 3/ and subsequently improved in practice, continued to be applied, although UNFICYP experienced frequent difficulties. Efforts to increase UNFICYP's freedom of movement in the northern part of the island remained unsuccessful despite direct discussions with all concerned and assurances given to UNFICYP that a positive response would be forthcoming in the near future.

9. During the period under review, there was an increase in the number of occasions on which UNFICYP vehicles and personnel were stopped by the military forces of both sides when approaching or entering the United Nations buffer zone. In addition, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or are not frequently patrolled. During the last six months, there was a marked increase in the number of incidents on both sides when weapons were cocked and pointed at UNFICYP personnel on foot and in vehicles. On one occasion, a Turkish forces sentry fired a warning shot at an UNFICYP soldier in the buffer zone. UNFICYP made strong representations to the authorities of both sides, emphasizing the dangers of such actions while reiterating UNFICYP'S right to complete access to, and freedom of movement in, all parts of the buffer zone.

10. Following UNFICYP representations to Turkish Cypriot authorities, there was an improvement in the conduct of Turkish Cypriot police officers towards UNFICYP humanitarian staff and minorities resident in the north. UNFICYP must continue to rely on the firm support and cooperation of all parties in permitting uninterrupted freedom of movement and action so that it can carry out its established and important duties and responsibilities.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

11. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

12. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 151 observation posts, of which 51 (shortly to be reduced to 39) are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

13. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone, and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise civilian activities in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Royal Engineers maintain this track in usable condition.

14. In May 1992, 4/ I reported that UNFICYP had agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area of the buffer zone, on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming, and that despite strong protests from UNFICYP the National Guard had subsequently relaid the minefield. I also reported that the Government of Cyprus had agreed to remove the mines in question. During the period under review, the Government's commitment in this regard was not fulfilled, despite further representations by UNFICYP.

15. The number of cease-fire violations increased slightly in the last six months, but both sides continued to demonstrate restraint and discipline in this respect. There continued to be isolated incidents when shots were thought to have been fired deliberately. The military forces on both sides cooperated with UNFICYP's investigations and tension remained at a low level.

16. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, with only a few minor violations by both sides. I have requested the Force Commander to initiate discussions to extend the agreement to all areas of the buffer zone where the troops of both sides

remain in close proximity to each other. In response to my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ the Security Council, in its resolution 789 (1992), urged both sides to commit themselves to these measures.

17. During the period under review, there was a slight increase in the number of air violations, with 40 overflights of the buffer zone by Turkish forces aircraft and 13 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 17 overflights from the north and 8 from the south by civilian aircraft and 20 overflights by the Cyprus police airwing. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further 7 overflights. These violations create tension and increase the risk of serious incidents.

18. Once again during the period under review, the National Guard increased its programme of construction all along its cease-fire line. This remained a contentious issue, which at times caused an increase in tension and retaliation in kind by the Turkish forces. On two occasions UNFICYP strongly protested work on positions that were clearly in the buffer zone and therefore constituted a major cease-fire violation. The National Guard often refused to cooperate in UNFICYP's investigations and were reluctant to allow inspections of their positions.

19. There were no incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. UNFICYP continued to monitor the area closely to ensure that the status quo was maintained. However, UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continued to be restricted by the Turkish Cypriot security forces. As has been previously reported to the Security Council, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. 5/ This position has been reiterated to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions.

20. Despite UNFICYP's continued representations, Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats continued to violate the seaward extensions of the cease-fire lines known as the maritime security lines, which were established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security and safety purposes 6/ in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta. These violations raise tension and are potentially dangerous for the individuals concerned. I would, therefore, urge restraint by all parties and request them to assist UNFICYP in supporting this practical and necessary measure.

21. As stressed in my last report, 4/ threats to safety and security arose as a result of hunting by Greek Cypriots in certain areas of the buffer zone during the 1990/91 hunting season. This prompted UNFICYP to seek a ban on hunting in the buffer zone in the future. Following UNFICYP representations, the Government extended its support for this policy. As a consequence, the number of violations significantly decreased. However, UNFICYP has been obliged to commit considerable military and police personnel to maintain the integrity of the buffer zone during the hunting season. I trust that the government enforcement agencies will continue their efforts to eliminate hunting by Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone.

22. Each side again conveyed to me its concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. For my own part, I remain very concerned about the size and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation creates tension and increases the risk of serious incidents. As I stated in my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ and as was endorsed by the Council in its resolution 789 (1992), a reduction of the non-Cypriot troops to the level of a decade ago and the reciprocal suspension of the weapons acquisition programme on the Greek Cypriot side would contribute greatly to alleviating the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

23. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has for many years worked with technical authorities and agencies of both parties to facilitate humanitarian activities. It has used its "good offices" to sponsor bicommunal contacts and has encouraged authorities to cooperate in restoring normal conditions for members of both communities. Some successes have been achieved. However, these activities are labour intensive and the imminent reduction in UNFICYP's strength will constrain its ability to play as large a role as in the past. I accordingly urge both parties to increase their own efforts to cooperate in the management of essential humanitarian services and, in line with my report of 19 November and resolution 789 (1992), to promote people-to-people contact by reducing travel restrictions across the buffer zone.

24. Water reserves on the island remain satisfactory. A normal winter rainfall should replenish stocks and extend supplies well into 1993. Water authorities continue to honour bicommunal understandings on water distribution and cooperate on the repair of infrastructure. However, the condition of the Morphou aquifer continues to deteriorate. Despite pleas for cooperation to examine the extent of damage in order to formulate a bicommunal solution, no success has been achieved to date.

25. The number of Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island is now 544, of whom 541 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 3 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to provide them with humanitarian support, delivering foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus Red Cross. Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to levy customs duty on supplies deemed to be non-humanitarian in nature.

26. Again this year textbooks were not delivered to Greek Cypriot elementary schools in the Karpas in time for the 1992 academic year. UNFICYP obtained the texts early in May 1992, but the Turkish Cypriot authorities took an inordinate time to review them and then refused 35 out of 89 on the grounds that they contained material which was considered offensive to Turkish Cypriots.

27. UNFICYP continued to interview Greek Cypriots who applied for "permanent transfer" to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the

transfer was voluntary. Two such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 601 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas area to the southern part of the island. UNFICYP continued to request that Turkish Cypriot authorities loosen the current tight restrictions on the frequency and duration of temporary transfers to the south by Greek Cypriots living in the north.

28. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and assisted in arranging family reunion visits for Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace hotel. For some time, it has been apparent that Turkish Cypriot authorities give preference to applications for family meetings which originate in the north. Despite assurances from Turkish Cypriot officials, the majority of applications from Turkish Cypriots living in the south are not facilitated.

29. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island has continued to decline and is now 250. UNFICYP continued to help them contact Maronites living elsewhere on the island and delivered to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

30. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation of civilian members of both communities resident in the north. When the need arose, UNFICYP delivered medicines through the Red Cross to members of the Turkish Cypriot community. Difficulties associated with the transport of Turkish Cypriots to hospital in the south were satisfactorily resolved.

31. Since 1974, UNFICYP has provided many essential services in support of the Cyprus Red Cross. In an effort to reduce demands on UNFICYP's declining manpower, UNFICYP recommended that Red Cross officials of both parties discuss how they can progressively resume their original responsibilities. The Greek Cypriot officials gave initial support for such discussions, but the Turkish Cypriot side failed to respond positively.

32. The mixed village of Pyla, located in the buffer zone, remained a major preoccupation for UNFICYP. The Force has actively assisted the two mukhtars in exercising the full range of their responsibilities and has, on a strictly humanitarian basis, facilitated practical solutions to various controversial issues.

33. Recently, Turkish Cypriot authorities raised tension in Pyla by initiating projects without the required notification to, and permission of, UNFICYP. A project to upgrade the electricity service to Turkish Cypriots was terminated by UNFICYP on these grounds. A second project to erect a bust of Kemal Ataturk at the Turkish Cypriot elementary school was initially stopped, but after a full investigation and presentation of the required application UNFICYP allowed the project to be completed. The Turkish military post located in the buffer zone overlooking Pyla was responsible for several provocative actions, which caused tension in the village.

34. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road, south of the buffer zone, continued to block the flow of tourists and other visitors to Pyla and has severely disrupted its economy. On a number of occasions, UNFICYP has requested that this obstacle be removed.

35. UNFICYP continued to pursue discussion with the parties in order to facilitate telephone communications between Turkish Cypriot residents of Pyla and the north. It was pleased to learn that Turkish Cypriot officials are preparing to provide telephone services for Greek Cypriots in the Karpas and Maronites living in the Kormokiti area. UNFICYP continued to promote these important humanitarian projects.

36. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to promote bicommunal activities aimed at bringing together Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot expertise in areas of mutual concern. Some bicommunal activities were held outside the buffer zone and alternatively in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Efforts were made to move the bicommunal programmes from training and seminars to direct service activities. A medical centre intended to serve both Greek and Turkish Cypriots is being constructed. Neurology and genetics, cardiology and kidney and liver transplant are its pioneering components.

37. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development, continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued bicommunal projects with the various United Nations technical agencies active in Cyprus including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

38. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions (sixty-second to sixty-sixth), consisting of 18 meetings, of which 12 were attended by the 3 members of the Committee and their assistants and 6 were attended solely by the 3 members.

39. In my last report, 4/ I referred to a number of recommendations which had been made to both sides and which, if implemented, would permit the Committee to function in a more rational and effective way than it has in the past. This would, of course, be fully in accordance with its humanitarian objectives.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 December 1992, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and based on the revised strength

and responsibilities as outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the present report, is estimated at $9.5 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I.	Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
	Movement of contingents	200
	Operational expenses	1 600
	Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	590
	Rations	700
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 330
	Death and disability	100
	Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
	Total I	6 770
II.	Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
	Pay, allowances and transport	1 950
	Contingent-owned equipment	780
	Total II	2 730
	Grand total (I and II)	9 500

41. The above estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

42. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only $3.4 million have been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to December 1981. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $197.1 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

43. In my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 25 November the Council adopted resolution 789 (1992). I have been requested to keep the Council informed concerning the implementation of the confidence-building measures set out in paragraph 8 of that resolution and to submit a full report to the Council after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

44. It will be evident from this report that the progressive reductions in the strength of the Force which the troop-contributing Governments have found themselves obliged to make, largely for financial reasons, have brought UNFICYP to a point at which the viability of its present operational concept is in doubt. In particular, the withdrawal of the Danish battalion and the British scout car squadron will make it impossible for UNFICYP to maintain the same level of control of the buffer zone as in the past. Its ability to provide humanitarian support to the two communities will also be reduced. At the same time, UNFICYP faces a potential increase in its tasks if, as I hope, all concerned implement the confidence-building measures proposed in my report of 19 November 1992 1/ and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 789 (1992), especially those envisaged for Varosha.

45. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that they wish to make further reductions in their contingents during 1993 and I shall perforce take this into account in preparing the specific proposals on the restructuring of the Force requested in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 759 (1992). Meanwhile, I have asked the contributing Governments to maintain their contingents at their present strength (that is their strength after implementation of the reductions already announced (para. 4 above)) throughout the new six-month mandate period recommended in this report.

46. The principal cause of these difficulties is financial. For several years the Secretariat has predicted that unless the financing of UNFICYP was assured by assessed contributions it would prove impossible to maintain the Force. After the adoption of resolution 682 (1990) of 21 December 1990, the Secretariat cooperated actively with the Security Council in its deliberations on this issue and identified a new method of defining and rationalizing those costs incurred by the troop contributors for which the United Nations would be responsible. Unfortunately, the necessary agreement did not exist in the Council for a decision to be adopted on a change in the financing of UNFICYP, with the consequences now evident. I am pursuing my consultations with the troop-contributing Governments about a restructuring of the Force and will report as soon as possible to the Council. I am exploring the possibility of finding additional countries which could agree to contribute troops to replace those that are being withdrawn by the existing contributors. But my impression at this stage is that even if the Force is radically restructured, it is likely that a viable arrangement can only be on the basis of financing by assessed contributions.

47. The present and likely future reduction in the size of UNFICYP has major implications for the two parties. An even greater responsibility will rest on them for ensuring that there is no increase in tension in Cyprus and that conditions can be maintained for a speedy overall agreement as envisaged by the Security Council. With the reduction in UNFICYP's ability to control incidents, it is imperative that the two sides exercise maximum restraint and, in accordance with the proposed package of confidence-building measures, extend the unmanning agreement to all parts of the buffer zone where their forces remain in close proximity to each other. On the humanitarian side, it is also necessary for the two sides to work together so that their own agencies can resume the functions which, out of humanitarian concern and in its efforts to restore normal conditions, UNFICYP has assumed over the years.

48. The mixed village of Pyla is of particular concern in this regard. On my instructions, the authorities on both sides have been made aware of my anxiety about the situation there and my view that the bicommunal nature of the village demands special cooperation and understanding by both sides. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars must be allowed to work together without outside interference so that they can exercise the full range of their responsibilities in village affairs. I appeal again to both sides to refrain from interfering in local activities in Pyla.

49. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the continued presence of the Force on the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period, that is until 15 June 1993. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

50. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support that they have given to this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

51. In conclusion, I wish to pay a tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilión, to the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP, who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ S/24830 of 19 November 1992.

2/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275 and footnote 57.

Notes (continued)

3 See ibid., Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1983, document S/15812, para. 14.

4/ S/24050.

5/ S/18880, para. 28.

6/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17657, para. 19.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округа
Límite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
UN HP Coy ( )
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Tp
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Tp
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Liaison Post
KYRENIA
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Coy
One Coy
MP Det
One Sect
NICOSIA
UNCIVPOL Stn
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
UNCIVPOL Stn
FAMAGUSTA
MP Det
One Pl
One Pl
SECTOR 3
One Coy
Coy ( )
SECTOR 4
LARNACA
UNCIVPOL Stn
One Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
PAPHOS
One Pl
One Coy ( )
LIMASSOL
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ١٩٩٢
一九九二年十二月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF DECEMBER 1992
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE DÉCEMBRE 1992
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА ДЕКАБРЬ 1992
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN DICIEMBRE DE 1992
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 31 UNITED NATIONS DECEMBER 1992